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Abstract:
The term ‘promissory’ naturalism was borrowed from Karl Raymond Popper, 
who used a similar term in relation to materialism in one of his criticisms of 
this stance[1]. The subject of my reflections is the contemporary version of 
materialism – reductionist naturalism in relation to morality which I call natu-
ralism for simplicity[2]. With the use of the term ‘promissory’, I understand 
that the naturalistic concept of morality is the heir to ethical doctrines which 
it does not acknowledge, because it remains in an open opposition in rela-
tion to them, and it is built on this opposition. In other words, the naturalistic 
concept of morality contains hidden moral sources which naturalism itself 
can neither articulate nor derive from its assumptions. I will point out that the 
paradoxicality of reductionist naturalism in the matter of morality lies in the 
fact that it is a self-refuting doctrine. 
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Streszczenie:
Określenie naturalizm „zadłużony’ zapożyczyłam od Karla Rajmunda Pop-
pera, który użył podobnego terminu w odniesieniu do materializmu w jed-
1Popper, K. R., Eccles, J. (1977) The Self and Its Brain, Springer, Berlin, p. 96.  
2Reductionist naturalism, similarly to materialism, assumes the existence of only what 
can be researched in a scientific way, and reduces all spiritual and cultural phenomena 
(including morality, law, art) to the physical world. On the different varieties of naturalism, 
see. Flanagan, O. (2006) Varieties of naturalism, in: The Oxford Handbook of Religion and 
Science, eds. Clayton, Ph., Simpson, Z., Oxford University Press, p. 430–452.
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Evolutionary sources of morality
Nowadays, there is a lot of research on moral-
ity in sociobiology, game theory, experimental 
economics, evolutionary biology, cognitive 
psychology, social psychology, evolutionary 
psychology, anthropology, etc.[1]. These stud-
ies are intended to better understand what mo-
rality is and how it could have been developed. 
The main subject of this research is to analyze 
1Churchland, P. (2012) Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells 
Us about Morality. Princeton University Press, Princeton; 
de Waal, F. (2016) Primates and Philosophers: How Morality 
Evolved. Princeton University Press, Princeton; Joyce, R. (2007) 
The Evolution of Morality, Bradford Book; Katz, L. D. (2000) 
Evolutionary Origins of Morality, Imprint Academic; Dunbar, R. 
(2013) Nowa historia ewolucji człowieka, Kraków; Tomasello, M. 
(2009) Why We Cooperate, The MIT Press, Boston.  
the phenomenon of altruism and cooperation 
which the authors of these studies consider 
as the core of morality. The method of this re-
search is usually a regression analysis, i.e., a 
statistical method that serves to predict the 
unknown value of a variable (property) based 
on known values of the variable and function 
that illustrates their relationship (correlation)[2].
The research consists in comparing different 
groups in terms of data and an attempt to show 
the coexistence of phenomena, for example 
the correlation between innate predispositions 
to altruistic behaviors and cooperative behav-
ior which is perceived as moral. Research on 
altruism is often conducted comparably in 
people, in particular children in the early stag-
2Kucharzyk, B. Wstęp, in: R. Dunbar, Nowa historia…  
nej ze swoich krytyk tego stanowiska[3]. Przedmiotem moich rozważań jest 
współczesna wersja materializmu – redukcjonistyczny naturalizm w odnie-
sieniu do moralności, który dalej dla uproszczenia nazywam po prostu na-
turalizmem[4]. Przez „zadłużenie’ naturalizmu rozumiem zaś to, że naturali-
styczna koncepcja moralności jest spadkobierczynią doktryn etycznych, do 
których się nie przyznaje, ponieważ pozostaje w stosunku do nich w otwar-
tej opozycji i na tej opozycji jest zbudowana. Innymi słowy, naturalistyczna 
koncepcja moralności zawiera w sobie ukryte źródła moralne, których sam 
naturalizm nie potrafi ani wyartykułować, ani wyprowadzić ze swoich zało-
żeń. Zwrócę uwagę, że paradoksalność redukcjonistycznego naturalizmu 
w kwestii moralności polega na tym, że jest to doktryna samoobalająca. 
Słowa kluczowe: 
naturalizm, redukcjonizm, materializm, utylitaryzm, psychologia ewolucyjna 
3Popper, K. R., Eccles, J. (1977) The Self and Its Brain, Springer, Berlin, p. 96. Popper uses 
the term promissory materialism therein.  
4Reductionist naturalism, similarly to materialism, assumes the existence of only what 
can be researched in a scientific way, and reduces all spiritual and cultural phenomena 
(including morality, law, art) to the physical world. On the different varieties of naturalism, 
see: Flanagan, O. (2006) Varieties of naturalism, in: Clayton, Ph., Simpson, Z. (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, Oxford University Press, p. 430–452.





es of development (up to the third year of life) 
which would exclude the explanation of certain 
behaviors by the influence of socialization. This 
research is also conducted on close relatives 
of people – chimps, in order to extract typically 
human features associated with altruistic be-
havior considered by researchers as moral. It 
should be emphasized that this type of study 
does not explain the causal relationship be-
tween phenomena, but only shows a positive 
or negative correlation of phenomena which is 
subject to interpretations. There is always the 
possibility that despite a strong positive cor-
relation of certain phenomena, their co-oc-
currence is accidental, because there may be 
some unremarkable third factor that explains 
the appearance of both phenomena indepen-
dently of each other.  
The research hypothesis is based on the fact 
that the inclination to altruism, or the willing-
ness to bear one’s own costs for the benefit 
of others, is innate and that it is the basis for 
behaviors considered to be moral. Morality in 
these considerations is reduced mainly to co-
operative abilities which would not be possible 
without altruistic tendencies. Altruistic ten-
dencies and cooperation were also observed 
in other animal species, but advanced forms 
of cooperation and specific forms of altruism 
characteristic only for humans are possible, 
according to researchers such as Michael To-
masello, thanks to intentionality (awareness 
of own and other people’s beliefs) which can 
assume a multi-level structure, and also be 
shared with others[3]. Shared intentionality ena-
bles people to share common intentions and 
goals while maintaining individual roles. Thanks 
to it, it is possible to create group rationality 
and common identity which is connected with 
the fact that we understand ourselves through 
interactions with others and through our group 
affiliation. It also enables the development of 
social norms and institutions. Intentionality is 
crucial to morality indeed – it allows to dis-
tance to oneself and to one’s interests enabling 
an unbiased view (the so-called view from no-
where which Thomas Nagel wrote about)[4].
Most of the researchers from the above-men-
tioned fields present a naturalistic stance in 
morality, recognizing that the moral sense is 
a brain function similar to three-dimensional 
vision – a set of neuron circuits shaped by 
natural selection so that it can perform a spe-
cific task[5]. Morality on naturalistic grounds is 
3Tomasello, M. Why We Cooperate….; Dunbar, R. Nowa 
historia..., p. 65 ff. 
4Nagel, T. (1989) The View from Nowhere, Oxford University 
Press, OxforD. On the subject of intentionality in ethics, see also 
Spaemann, R. (2001) Osoby. O różnicy między czymś a kimś, 
Warszawa, p. 61–76. 
5Pinker, S. (2003) The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human 
Morality on naturalistic grounds is understood in a func-
tionalist way; its cultivation was intended to serve spe-
cies functions – survival and gene transfer which required 
cooperation.
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understood in a functionalist way; its cultiva-
tion was intended to serve species functions 
– survival and gene transfer which required 
cooperation. Morality is possible thanks to a 
set of adaptations that allow selfish individu-
als to benefit from cooperation. These adap-
tations are understood as psychological skills 
and dispositions that promote collaboration 
and group success. They are implemented 
in our brains mainly as emotional reactions 
which cause that we value the interests of 
some other individuals and expect the same 
from them[6]. From the point of view of the 
aforementioned studies, man has an altruistic 
and cooperative nature, and acquires selfish 
tendencies as a result of experience and in-
teraction with others[7]. It can be said that con-
temporary research is a greater confirmation 
to Rousseau’s hypothesis that man is ‘a noble 
savage’, while denying Hobbes’ hypothesis 
that ‘a man is a wolf to another man’. 
The moral structure of the mind
The statement based on the observations of 
the existence of inborn mechanisms by which 
people are capable of altruism, cooperation 
or rule-following in their lives, in no way de-
termines the content of morality. According to 
representatives of the naturalistic conception 
of morality, however, it is possible to consider 
which ethical doctrines are most compatible 
with the naturalistic assumptions. This type 
of venture is undertaken by many contem-
porary researchers, mainly evolutionary psy-
Nature, Penguin.
6Haidt, J. (2013) The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are 
Divided by Politics and Religion, Vintage, New York. 
7Tomasello, M. Why We Cooperate… 
chologists and cognitive scientists dealing 
with morality. Interestingly, most researchers, 
independently and in different ways, come 
to the same conclusion that utilitarianism is 
the ethical doctrine most consistent with the 
assumptions of naturalism. Using one of the 
most transparent arguments on the subject, 
presented in the book by Joshua Greene enti-
tled Moral tribes,[8] I will present how one can 
come to these conclusions. Furthermore, I will 
then consider why utilitarianism seems to be 
consistent with naturalism. 
Referring to contemporary research of cognitive 
scientists, psychologists and neurobiologists, 
Greene in his understanding of moral thinking, 
uses a distinction between two cognitive sys-
tems: automatic and reflective[9]. On this basis, 
he creates a model of a dual-process moral 
brain which covers both intuitive and rational 
morality. Reasoning generates rational morality 
which is conscious, abstract, and flexible, but 
at the same time requires a lot of mental effort 
which makes it expensive and much slower. Au-
tomatic emotional reactions (automatic settings) 
give rise to intuitive morality which guides us in 
an efficient (it costs relatively little energy), fast, 
associative, unconscious, emotional and inflex-
ible way. Just as we use the native language in 
an automatic way and just like we reflexively 
dodge a punch or shiver at the sight of a mouse, 
we can also, without giving it any thought, try 
to save the necessitous, feel reluctant towards 
incest or shudder and cover our eyes at the suf-
8Greene, J. (2013) Moral tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap 
between Us and Them, New York. 
9Kahneman, D. (2012) Thinking, Fast and Slow. Penguin; Thaler, 
R. H., Sunstein, C. R. (2009) Nudge: Improving Decisions About 
Health, Wealth, and Happiness, Penguin Books; Haidt, J. (2001) 
The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist 
Approach to Moral Judgment, Psychological Review, vol. 108, 
no. 4, p. 814–834.  





fering inflicted on others (even when it is purely 
fictitious, e.g., when watching a fictional film). 
In the author’s opinion, intuitive morality was 
shaped partly by genes and partly by culture 
and education. Biological information has been 
recorded in the genotype and contains the ex-
perience of ancestors, passed on to descend-
ants in accordance with the mechanism of 
natural selection. Education, on the other hand, 
is a collection of information based on our own 
experience, an established method of trial and 
error, along with cultural heritage, containing 
experience of the so-called significant others[10] 
– that is, people who are close to us, who we 
admire and imitate. 
By comparing the human brain to an airplane, 
one can say that moral judgment based on 
emotional reaction (automatic settings) is like 
flying on an autopilot mode, and using reason-
ing in moral judgments is like flying on a manual 
mode. Undoubtedly, both sorts of settings are 
needed for proper functioning in the world. Au-
tomatic settings include not only emotional re-
actions but also our habits. In relatively simple 
and repetitive situations, in less complicated 
daily choices, the autopilot system is optimal. 
If we had to deliberate about making every de-
cision every day, from choosing the right path 
to work, through choosing the coffee we want 
to drink, up to choosing the manner and form 
of work – we would be completely paralyzed 
by the excess of necessary decisions and ex-
hausted with considering all possible options. 
Our habits that make up our lifestyle prevent 
us from such an uncomfortable situation. The 
complex system of signs, symbols and stand-
ards that we use in social life, so that we do 
not have to think about who has to do what 
and when, serves a similar purpose. Thanks to 
10The term ‘significant others’ comes from Georg Herbert Mead. 
this system, we avoid conflicts and coordinate 
our activities – we know who to let pass at the 
intersection to avoid an accident, and where 
to throw away trash (and even what rubbish to 
put into which container). The same applies to 
the skills that we gain, often as a result of ef-
fort and deliberation, and, over time, transform 
them into habits and automatisms, thanks to 
which we save a lot of energy. An experienced 
driver does not have to think about changing 
gears or activating appropriate signaling, just 
as a good dancer or a good sportsman per-
form their activities completely smoothly (or 
‘naturally’, as it is often called), not requiring 
reflection on particular, learned movements. In 
other words, both modes of the brain should 
co-operate and support each other – reason-
ing should shape the automatic settings and 
constantly correct them in order to avoid cog-
nitive errors, and the automatic settings should 
relieve the reflective system in everyday work. 
As it is pointed out mainly by researchers in the 
field of psychology and behavioral economics, 
the automatic settings are based on heuristics 
(mental abbreviations) that are extremely sus-
ceptible to cognitive biases[11]. 
If these two cognitive modes of the brain are 
also applicable in moral thinking, as Greene 
points out, then undoubtedly intuitive morality 
is also susceptible to similar irrational errors 
which in this context are most often referred 
to as prejudice. According to Greene, intuitive 
morality is the optimal solution in everyday, 
normal circumstances in which it works with-
out any problems. However, in unknown and 
11These errors have their sources in the heuristics of anchoring, 
adaptation, availability, representativeness, priming, status 
quo tendencies, framing, herding (conformism), the quest 
for immediate gratuities etc., which is discussed in detail in 
the aforementioned works by Kahneman, Thaler, Sunstein: 
Kahneman, D. Thinking, Fast and Slow…; Thaler, R. H., 
Sunstein, C. R. Nudge…
Polish Law Review  www.polishlawreview.pl
ORIGINAL ARTICLE“Promissory” naturalism...
249
changing situations, as well as complicated 
and complex social problems, our autopilot 
fails and then it becomes necessary to switch 
to manual mode of the brain – rational moral-
ity, based on abstract principles. Automatic 
settings are used to control most of our be-
haviors, and manual mode allows overcom-
ing habits and automatisms when the need 
arises. It is worth paying attention to what the 
author describes as intuitive morality. In refer-
ence to the evolutionary sources of morality, 
the author recognizes intuitive morality as a 
biological adaptation whose primary function 
was to guarantee the best adaptation and 
survival of the species which was achieved 
through altruistic tendencies and the ability 
to cooperate. This evolutionary adaptation 
which we inherited from our ancestors, can 
be, as the author emphasizes, used for vari-
ous purposes, not necessarily consistent with 
its evolutionary function. 
Moreover, according to Greene, intuitive mo-
rality developed by evolution, modified through 
education and socialization, is on the one hand 
a solution to many moral conflicts, but on the 
other hand, it creates moral conflicts itself. The 
reason for this ambiguous role of intuitive mo-
rality is that people have been programmed 
by evolution to cooperate in relatively small 
groups, based on personal relationships and 
direct contact; innate altruism with a limited 
scope served this purpose (one usually names 
kin selection and reciprocal altruism). It is as-
sumed that by natural selection, individuals 
cooperating within the group were selected for 
procreation, thanks to which the genes of co-
operation were passed to subsequent genera-
tions. At the same time, due to the scarcity of 
goods in the world and the need to compete 
for goods, natural selection promoted inter-
group competition. Thus, the universal scope 
of altruism and cooperation is inconsistent 
with the principles of evolution and natural se-
lection. For these reasons, our innate tendency 
to cooperate allows us to put our group’s in-
terests above self-interest, as well as above 
the interests of other groups and their mem-
bers. This latter tendency is now referred to as 
tribalism and has pejorative connotations. It 
involves loyalty to the group to which one be-
longs, and at the same time assigning a prior-
ity to one’s own group over other groups and 
their members. It may also involve an attitude 
of hostility toward strangers. Evolutionary mo-
rality is therefore able to resolve intra-group 
conflicts (“Me versus Us’), but at the same time 
generates intergroup conflicts (“We versus 
Them’). Intra-group conflicts mainly consist in 
conflicts between individualism and collectiv-
ism which is the result of cooperation which 
requires individual self-sacrifice. Rarely do 
we deal with strict convergence of individual 
good with common good (an example of such 
convergence can be two people rowing, when 
individual interest in reaching the shore is as 
It seems that evolutionary psychology does not say any-
thing about morality itself, but rather about adaptive mech-
anisms that allow both morality and its total opposite.





the same the common interest). The morality of 
intra-group cooperation is intuitive, automatic 
and based on emotions. Nonaggression (in re-
lation to ‘those of one’s kind’) is also a form of 
such cooperation. As for the conflicts on the 
second level – they are more difficult to solve 
because intuition is directed by group ego-
ism, and its overcoming requires an effort of 
reflection. Group egoism is so deeply rooted in 
us that it can also influence our interpretation 
of facts and the perception of the world (this 
leads to the phenomenon of the so-called jus-
tice bias). As Greene writes, each of us looks 
at the world through the moral lens of group 
practices, customs and values. 
Due to the contemporary problems of global 
threats: overpopulation, ecological threats, 
armed conflicts – the basic problem of mo-
rality is finding a way to extend the scope of 
cooperation over our group and overcome the 
‘We versus Them’ opposition. Intuitive moral-
ity is not adapted to the requirements of the 
modern world in which we operate, where 
cooperation requires a complicated system 
of division of labor, takes place in huge, mul-
timillion groups, as well as at the intergroup 
level[12]. For these reasons, to overcome tribal-
ism and solve complicated global problems, 
it is necessary to refer to rational morality. 
The solution of moral conflicts through reflec-
tion should take place, according to Greene, 
based on utilitarian reasoning, because it as-
sumes a common moral currency (common 
12As Dietrich Birnbacher points out, biological evolution is an 
extremely slow process, and our current biological equipment 
has developed in the Stone Age and may not be fully 
adequate to the conditions in which man currently functions. 
Therefore, the cultural evolution of man (including technology 
and medicine) tries to make up for the shortcomings of 
biological evolution (Birnbacher, D. (2008) Posthumanity, 
Transhumanism and Human Nature, in:   Medical 
Enhancement and Posthumanity, eds. Gordijn, G. , Chadwick, 
R., Springer, Berlin, p. 95–106).
moral language) which is the principle of max-
imizing utility (happiness). It is based on sim-
ple, difficult to refute, in the author’s opinion, 
assumptions: no one wants to suffer; every-
one wants to be happy. These assumptions 
lead utilitarians to accept the golden rule: 
your happiness and your suffering have nei-
ther greater nor lesser significance than the 
happiness and suffering of anyone else (the 
fundamental principle of impartiality). Without 
going into the discussion about the already 
repeatedly criticized assumptions and conclu-
sions of utilitarianism as an ethical theory,[13] I 
will focus only on the attempt to answer why 
for so many authors, utilitarianism seems to 
be the theory best suited to naturalism and 
whether it is really justified. 
The vicious circle of naturalism
Greene admits in his book that he was fasci-
nated with utilitarianism from his early youth, 
and the knowledge which he gained later in 
the field of evolutionary psychology reas-
sured him in his beliefs, providing arguments 
for accepting utilitarianism as the best exist-
ing metaethics. At the same time, the author 
is aware that we cannot draw any normative 
conclusions about how to act from a purely 
descriptive theory of evolution. The evolu-
tionary imperative of the most effective gene 
transfer cannot be equated with morality. The 
knowledge that our genes endeavor to survive 
does not imply that we should do everything 
to make it easier for them. From an evolution-
13See, among others: Kymlicka, W. (2002) Contemporary 
Political Philosophy: An Introduction. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford; Williams, B., Smart, J. J. C. (1973) Utilitarianism: For and 
Against, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Williams, B., 
Sen, A. (1982) Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge.
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ary point of view, such phenomena as rape, 
violence, and even mass extermination can 
be completely understood as strategies for 
reproductive success and the survival of our 
genes at the expense of other genes. From 
a moral point of view, such strategies are 
considered unacceptable. It seems that evo-
lutionary psychology does not say anything 
about morality itself, but rather about adap-
tive mechanisms that allow both morality and 
its total opposite[14]. 
Let us note that Greene, presenting a model 
of the dual-process moral brain, does not give 
an answer to the question of how and why 
we switch from autopilot to manual mode. 
He only says that we have this opportunity 
to overcome prejudices resulting from intui-
tive morality and deal with completely new 
or complicated conflicts. However, it is not 
difficult to imagine the case of a person who 
does not feel any internal conflicts caused by 
pursuing their interest and the interest of their 
own group even if it is at the expense of other 
groups and their members (Greene’s book 
contains many examples of this type of atti-
tudes). Greene’s theory does not explain to us 
what might motivate such a person to switch 
from an automatic system to a rational sys-
tem, unless we first assume that this person 
is, like the author, a utilitarian.
If one were to accept reductionist naturalism 
on the basis of morality with all consequence, 
then one should recognize that individual the-
ories, including ethical theories which people 
accept, are only a certain rationalization of 
14It is this awareness that shows us the significance of the moral 
horizon openly rejected but implicitly assumed by naturalistic 
conceptions of morality, as Charles Taylor points out Taylor, Ch. 
(2001) Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity. 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, p. 333-334.
their own emotional reactions. Psychologist 
Daniel Kahneman compared various theories 
explaining the moral stance adopted by us 
regarding the famous trolley problem to con-
fabulation of a hypnotized person[15]. When 
a hypnotized person receives an order from 
a hypnotist to open a window and is awak-
ened from hypnosis at the time of this action, 
they can give a lot of imaginary reasons to the 
question of why they are doing this without 
actually knowing the true cause; for instance, 
this person will say that they are opening the 
window because they felt it was too hot. Ac-
cording to many psychologists, people often 
do not understand why they do something or 
why they believe in something because they 
are caused by subconscious factors which 
constitute specific adaptations[16]. In such 
situations people do not have privileged ac-
cess to themselves but when asked to explain 
their actions or views, they always give vari-
ous explanations which they sincerely believe, 
although they turn out to be mere confabula-
tions. According to Kahneman, philosophers 
act in the same way, trying to justify their mor-
al beliefs or choices, not knowing that they 
are adaptations, independent of the adopted 
ex post reasoning. 
The famous sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson 
drew attention to this problem, writing:
“Like everyone else, philosophers measure 
their personal emotional responses to vari-
15Kahneman, D. (2009) chapter 3, in: Voorhoeve, A.,
Conversations on Ethics, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Criticism of this stance: Kamm, F. M. (2013) Methodology,
in: Kamm, F. M. Bioethical Prescriptions. To Create, End,
Choose, and Improve Lives, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
p. 577–584.
16Wilson, T. (2005) Strangers to Ourselves, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge MA.





ous alternatives as though consulting a hid-
den oracle. The oracle resides in the deep 
emotional centers of the brain, […] a com-
plex array of neurons and hormone-secreting 
cells […]. Human emotional responses and 
the more general ethical practices based 
on them have been programmed to a sub-
stantial degree by natural selection over 
thousands of generations. The challenge to 
science is to measure the tightness of the 
constraints caused by the programming, to 
find their source in the brain, and to decode 
their significance through the reconstruction 
of the evolutionary history of the minds[17]’.
It can therefore be said that the acceptance 
by Greene or other evolutionary psycholo-
gists of utilitarianism is only an answer to their 
own emotional response to the problems and 
conflicts related to cooperation and rivalry 
discussed by them. From the point of view of 
the theory of evolution, there is no reason why 
other people, having different emotional reac-
tions from these authors should adopt a utili-
tarian theory. The science dealing with evolu-
tionary brain reconstruction can explain to us 
what mechanisms trigger our motives, but it 
cannot tell us anything, as Wilson observes, 
about what motives we should indulge in, and 
what should we suppress or sublimate. At the 
center of this dilemma, there is a vicious circle 
to which he draws attention: 
“[…] we are forced to choose among the ele-
ments of human nature by reference to value 
systems which these same elements created 
in an evolutionary age now long vanished[18]’.
17Wilson, E. O. (2004) On Human Nature. Harvard University 
Press, Harvard, p. 6.
18Ibidem, p. 196.
Overcoming this vicious circle is not possible 
without referring to the a priori moral values 
that will be considered the standards of judg-
ment of our evolutionary tendencies and de-
sires, and not their result. All representatives 
of naturalistic conceptions of morality do so, 
although not everyone admits it, because the 
naturalistic conception aspires to a scientific 
and purely descriptive theory. The criteria that 
naturalists take are, for example, the funda-
mental principle of impartiality, the greatest 
happiness principle or the principle of survival. 
At the same time, these criteria are not acci-
dentaly assumptions of utilitarianism, an ethi-
cal doctrine which evolved from the same in-
tellectual sources as naturalism itself. Wilson 
recognizes, just like Greene, the ideal of impar-
tiality as a cardinal value that allows overcom-
ing the blind process of evolution:
“Because natural selection has acted on to 
the behavior of individuals who benefit them-
selves and their immediate relatives, human 
nature bends us to the imperatives of selfish-
ness and tribalism. But a more detached view 
of the long-range course of evolution should 
allow us to see beyond the blind decision-
making process of natural selection and to 
envision the history and future of our own 
genes against the background of the entire 
human species. A word already in use intui-
tively defines this view: nobility. Had dino-
saurs grasped the concept they might have 
survived. They might have been us[19]’. 
The representatives of naturalism refer in their 
considerations about morality to the so-called 
strong evaluation which constitutes a wider, 
questioned by them framework, which I will 
discuss in the next section.  
19Ibidem, p. 197.
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Hidden moral sources  
of naturalism
In Sources of the Self – one of the most im-
portant philosophical books of the second 
half of the twentieth century – Charles Taylor 
draws attention to the characteristic feature 
of contemporary naturalistic ethical concep-
tions, including utilitarianism, which consists 
in suppression of one’s own moral sources 
which leads to the atrophy of spiritual life[20]. 
Every ethical theory must, by definition, refer 
to a moral horizon that enables us to respond 
to good – that is, to define what is important 
and what is not important in our life, what to 
strive for and what to avoid, what is right and 
what is wrong (in other words, what makes 
sense in life). Strong evaluation enables us to 
be orientated in moral space, thanks to which 
we know who we are. This refers to what 
Harry Frankfurt calls the second-order de-
sires (a desire to have a certain desire) in his 
extremely important text about free will and 
the concept of a person[21]. Thanks to them, 
self-reflection is possible; they have the ability 
to revise the first-order desires (hunger, physi-
20Taylor, Ch. Sources of the Self….
21Frankfurt, H. G. (1971) Freedom of the will and the concept of a 
person, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 68, p. 5–20.
ological needs, etc., can be considered first-
order desires).  
The naturalistic conception of morality rejects 
strong moral evaluation and references to on-
tology, at the same time accepting them as 
hidden assumptions on which naturalism is 
based, thus its research goes beyond the de-
scription of human behavior and tendencies. 
From a naturalistic point of view, moral reac-
tions are understood as gut reactions which 
can be modified to a certain extent by the cold 
calculation of reason. The willingness to help 
others is thus considered at the same level 
as the desire to ventilate a room where it be-
comes stuffy and unwillingness to do harm at 
the same level as feeling nauseous. The point, 
however, is that respecting someone else’s 
life or being guided by someone else’s good 
is not the result of physiological reactions, but 
rather the standards by which certain reactions 
can be judged and considered as appropriate. 
Avoiding harming others on the grounds of a 
naturalistic conception of morality is not only 
a physiological reaction, but also an (implicit) 
expression of beliefs regarding the subject of 
the reaction. The tendency to altruism is not 
only a tendency, but it is also a desirable ten-
dency, i.e., subject to strong evaluation of evo-
lutionary psychology. Similarly, compassion is 
not discussed by the aforementioned scholars 
as a pure inducement, but as what we should 
Respecting someone else’s life or being guided by some-
one else’s good is not the result of physiological reactions, 
but rather the standards by which certain reactions can be 
judged and considered as appropriate.





feel in a particular situation. To find out what 
makes given reactions, inclinations or mo-
tives right or wrong, one has to refer to a set 
of qualitative distinctions, as Taylor points out, 
which constitute our moral horizon. The reac-
tions discussed by naturalists ‘presuppose a 
moral consciousness, or at least some sense 
of strong evaluation’[22]. Naturalistic concep-
tions reject framework, questioning the im-
portance of qualitative distinctions, but at the 
same time they cannot do without them, so 
they smuggle them as implicit assumptions of 
their theories. These distinctions are based on 
goods that naturalistic conceptions recognize 
a priori as valuable, such as: universal benevo-
lence, the affirmation of ordinary life and coop-
eration, self-fulfillment, equality and freedom, 
instrumental reason, etc. Not coincidentally, 
utilitarianism seems to be an ethical theory 
most compatible with naturalism, because it 
is based on ideals that express these values. 
These ideals are inherited by utilitarianism from 
ethical doctrines with which it remains in open 
opposition, hence it does not try to openly 
articulate their meaning. These ideals are: 1) 
the ideal of impartiality (equality, rationality, 
universalism) and 2) the imperative of univer-
sal benevolence (altruism). It is worth adding 
here that the first of these ideals is guided by 
rational morality, and the second ideal is the 
basis of intuitive morality, yet the broadening 
of its scope depends on reason as can be read 
in Greene’s book discussed here. 
The ideal of impartiality
Taylor, in his ambitious synthesis of the 
thought horizons of the modern Western 
world, carries an impressive genealogy of 
22Taylor, Ch. Sources of the Self…, p. 333.
explicit and implicit moral sources on which 
modern identity is based. From Plato, through 
Saint Augustine to Descartes and Locke, the 
author follows the process of internalizing 
moral sources which is associated with the 
birth of radical reflexivity. The internalization 
of moral sources consists in the fact that one 
gradually discards the derivation of morality 
from sources external to man, such as the ob-
jective order of Nature, the authority of God or 
the authority of other people. To this end, the 
idea of noncommitted instrumental rationality 
arises which constitutes a detached point of 
view concerning morality, similar to the point 
of view of an uncommitted observer. 
Impartiality implies self-disengagement as a 
condition for the legitimacy of the judgments 
and is an attempt to imitate exact sciences by 
the post-Enlightenment philosophy in which 
research neutrality and objectivity are required 
which is clearly visible especially in the philos-
ophy of Kant and Hegel. According to the lat-
ter, the goal of philosophy is to overcome that 
which is individual in favour of abstract gener-
alities, of being as such[23]. An impartial decision 
on the ground of morals can be characterized 
as being generally and publicly defendable 
and which may not be reasonably rejected by 
anyone[24]. According to John Rawls, the im-
partiality of judgments may be attained without 
recourse to the notion of truth, because it only 
refers to what reasonable and rational entities 
can together agree on striving to reach the 
so-called reflective equilibrium[25]. Such an ap-
23Hegel, G. W. F. (1991) Science of Logic, Prometheus Books, 
Buffalo.   
24Scanlon, T. (2000) What We Owe to Each Other, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, p. 6–7. 
25Rawls, J. (1999) A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press, 
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proach becomes the ideal of moral evaluation, 
a guarantee of equality and freedom, leading 
to proceduralism in ethics which goes hand in 
hand with rationalism and universalism. In this 
way modern ethical rationalism emerges which 
is most clearly presented by the utilitarian doc-
trine and the competitive deontology of Kant.
Rationalist procedural ethics based on the ideal 
of impartiality and instrumental rationality were 
criticized by many philosophers. One of the most 
passionate critics was Friedrich Nietzsche, who 
rejected the neutrality ideal as a condition for a 
fruitful pursuit of philosophy[26]. On the contrary, 
he argued that philosophical problems, espe-
cially those that concern our values, should 
be treated with the greatest possible personal 
approach – commitment and passion. He con-
sidered it redundant to strive for a generalized 
and abstract interpretation that every human 
being would have to consider right, because 
such reasoning is based on too many unjus-
tified simplifications. First, on the simplifica-
tion that human individuals can be reduced 
to some ideal human being (such as ‘man in 
general’) which are predetermined according 
to certain arbitrary criteria (e.g. rationality). 
Secondly, such a reasoning assumes that we 
can take into account the perspectives of oth-
ers and distance ourselves from our own which 
Nietzsche believes is a false hope, because the 
perspectives of others can only be available 
to us in terms of what is similar in us. Infatu-
ation with instrumental rationality contributed 
to naturalism’s adoption of the presumption 
that a human being can be described as the 
subject of objective scientific research which, 
Cambridge.
26On this topic, see Soniewicka, M. (2017) After God. The 
Normative Power of the Will from the Nietzschean Perspective, 
Peter Lang Edition, Frankfurt am Main.
as Nietzsche pointed out, and following him 
– Taylor, is wrong, because it is impossible to 
describe the subject in isolation from the way 
in which this subject interprets its experiences 
and understands itself.
On the other hand, critics of the ideal of im-
partiality and instrumental rationalism in eth-
ics were conducted by British empiricists, 
considering the key role of feelings and emo-
tions, and not reason, in shaping attitudes 
and moral actions. This postulate was ab-
sorbed in an interesting way by naturalism, 
to which I will move on to in the next point. 
The imperative of universal 
benevolence
The birth of utilitarianism on the grounds 
of British empiricism should be considered 
against the background of social changes 
taking place in the 17th century. A great de-
velopment of production and trade took 
place which favored the maximization of 
wealth by the bourgeoisie and the birth of 
capitalism. Social transformation was as-
sociated with the gradual transformation of 
consciousness and customs of the influen-
tial social class involved in these changes. 
With the strengthening of the bourgeoisie, 
the attitude of pragmatism, characteristic 
for tradesmen and traders, began to domi-
nate, where utility, instrumental approach 
to the world, ownership, work, contract and 
exchange were the basic values[27]. The Prot-
27Hannah Arendt aptly diagnoses the links between utilitarian 
ideals of the measure of happiness and socio-economic 
determinants, noting that the ideal of utility permeates the 
society of craftsmen (this homo faber mentality makes 
everything perceived in terms of means and goals, that 
there occurs degradation of many goods through their 
instrumentalization), the ideal of comfort pervades the society of 





estant religion had a significant influence on 
the development of middle-class ethics and 
the spirit of capitalism[28]. Bourgeoisie ethics 
breaks with the ancient ideals of contempla-
tion (vita contemplativa) and public activ-
ity (vita activa) as the best ways to achieve 
a good life, replacing it with the affirmation 
of ordinary life, in which family life and work 
(and not asceticism or a social role) are to 
ensure self-fulfillment. 
In Christian theological discussions of that pe-
riod, voluntarism began to be rejected and the 
theory of reward and punishment was opposed 
to, replacing it with the theory of the natural 
tendencies of a human being to good. Initially, 
this theory proclaimed by the Cambridge Pla-
tonists appealed to external moral sources, 
i.e., to God which directs every person to 
good. A similar theory was taken over by de-
ist concepts, assuming that Divine Providence 
guarantees the objective order of the world, 
of which the human nature is a part – and be-
cause it is part of the providential order of the 
employees, and the ideal of exchange is dominating in market 
societies(Arendt, H. (1998)  The Human Condition. Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, Chicago). 
28Weber, M. (2013) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform. 
world, it is good. Feelings and emotions which 
are part of human nature thus gain a special 
moral rank and acquire a normative character. 
It is assumed that natural human bent to love 
the good binds society, which becomes the 
basis for the ethics of universal benevolence. 
Assuming that everyone is striving for happi-
ness, it does not follow that we should strive 
for happiness in general. In order to be able 
to recognize this utilitarian imperative, an ad-
ditional assumption about the harmony of in-
terests which is the result of this natural hu-
man inclination to good, which in turn results 
from God’s order of nature, must be accepted. 
It is in this way that the theory of moral senti-
ments is born (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume) 
which Adam Smith transplanted to the ground 
of capitalism, laying the foundations for mod-
ern liberal economy. Establishing the existence 
of a harmony of interests lies in the fact that a 
person, pursuing his or her own good, acts si-
multaneously for the benefit of the public good 
through the ‘invisible hand’, using the Smith 
metaphor, which reconciles their interests and 
leads to general well-being[29].
29This assumption, accepted by utilitarians, Hannah Arendt 
calls the ‘communist fiction’ of the conformity of the interests of 
society as a whole, promising universal prosperity and harmony 
(Arendt, H. Human Condition…).
Naturalism therefore seems to be a powerful metanarra-
tive which can be perfectly combined with utilitarianism 
only when it affects us through its hidden moral horizon. 
Yet, as soon as we realize this, we are forced to give up 
naturalism, at least in its reductionist version.
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The requirement to strive for universal justice 
and happiness which is the basis of a utilitarian 
ethics of benevolence, is a transformation of 
the Christian concept of love (agape). By de-
taching one’s neighbor’s love from metaphysi-
cal roots and by internalizing moral sources, 
utilitarianism began to understand the commit-
ment to the common good in non-theistic cat-
egories, where the inclination to good became 
an innate predisposition to altruism and ceased 
to be seen as given from God. In other words, 
God’s grace has been replaced with evolution-
ary adaptations that enable us to meet the re-
quirements of universal benevolence. In this 
way, a moral horizon that is consistent with 
utilitarianism was born – naturalism which 
places moral sources in ‘the depths of nature 
within and without[30]’. As Taylor points out, this 
doctrine turned out to be a more serviceable 
religion for a democratic age – a new rebellious 
worldview, being a constitutive element of the 
Western culture[31]. 
Hidden moral sources of naturalistic con-
ceptions of morality, including utilitarianism, 
were revealed by Nietzsche in the most vivid 
way[32]. He believed that happiness under-
stood as prosperity, pleasure and comfort is 
not a universal idea at all but rather a reflec-
tion of the bourgeois preferences of English 
merchants who try to extend themselves to 
all humanity. He categorically rejected the 
herd perspective (including the perspective 
of species) in morality, considering that hap-
piness is something purely individual which 
cannot be reduced to a common denomina-
30Taylor, Ch. Sources of the Self…, p. 408. 
31Ibidem, p. 409. 
32See on this issue: Soniewicka, M. After God...
tor, calculated, measured or even compared. 
He also believed that happiness is an internal 
state resulting from our predisposition to ex-
periencing it, and not a goal to which one can 
strive[33]. 
An important charge which Nietzsche for-
mulated directly against the evolutionary 
psychology is that the research carried out 
within it is based on a priori assumptions (he 
called them superstitions) which narrowed 
their scopes and warped its results. The main 
superstition they start with is an a priori as-
sumption that altruism, mercy and an selfless 
perspective have some value in themselves. 
According to Nietzsche, these assumptions 
are the result of Christian values being deeply 
rooted in our culture which these researchers 
consider as universal and given values, seek-
ing their empirical confirmation:
‘When the English really believe that they 
‘intuitively’ know all by themselves what is 
good and what is evil; and when, as a result, 
they think that they do not need Christianity 
to guarantee morality any more, this is itself 
just the result of the domination of the Chris-
tian value judgment and an expression of the 
strength and depth of this domination’[34].
For these reasons, the German philosopher 
defines naturalistic humanism, including util-
itarianism and liberalism, as a homeopathic 
version of Christianity. Nietzsche mocks re-
33Nicolai Hartmann wrote in a similar way, saying that happiness 
and love can happen to us when we pursue other goals, but they 
cannot be the object of aspiration themselves in: Hartamann, N. 
(2007) Ethics. Moral Phenomena, vol. I, Routledge, p. 149–150.
34Nietzsche, F. (2005) Twilight of the Idols, in: The Anti-Christ, 
Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, eds. 
Ridley, A., Norman, J. tran. Norman, J. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, p. 194.





search which, based on the theory of evo-
lution and natural selection, leads from the 
‘Darwinian beast’ to the contemporary moral 
weakling who ‘no longer bites’, but is full 
of care and empathy, denies the self and is 
keen to cooperate[35]. The error committed by 
these scholars lies in what assume that the 
fact that they assume that what they want to 
prove – that there is a biological conditioning 
of non-egotistical moral feelings which are 
socially useful. 
Final remarks: the articulation of 
moral sources
Some naturalists, such as the aforementioned 
Edward O. Wilson are aware that the theory 
of evolution is a form of myth-creating metan-
arrative which is to replace the previous hori-
zons, enabling self-understanding: 
‛The core of scientist materialism is the evo-
lutionary epic. Let me repeat its minimum 
claims: that the laws of the physical sciences 
are consistent with those of the biological and 
social sciences and can be linked in chains of 
causal explanation; that life and mind have a 
physical basis; that the world as we know it 
has evolved from earlier worlds obedient to 
the same laws; and that the visible universe 
today is everywhere subject to these material-
ist explanations. The epic can be indefinitely 
strengthen up and down the line, but its most 
sweeping assertations cannot be proved with 
finality. […] the evolutionary epic is prob-
ably the best myth we will ever have. […] the 
mythopoeic requirements of the mind must 
somehow be met by scientific materialism so 
35Nietzsche, F. (2007) On The Genealogy of Morality, ed. K. 
Ansell-Pearson, tran. C. Diethe. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge.
as to reinvest our superb energies[36]’.
Wilson sincerely believes in the Promethe-
an spirit of science, recognizing the knowl-
edge by which a human being can control the 
world and dominate over other species as the 
‘destiny’ of humanity, hence he perceives sci-
entific materialism as the best mythology to 
express his faith. 
Taylor agrees with Wilson that the acceptance 
of reductionist naturalism requires a leap of 
faith which is allowed, in his opinion, by a vi-
sion of morality embedded in this worldview 
(one would not be able to live in accordance 
with the sole assumptions of reductionist nat-
uralism). However, Taylor does not share Wil-
son’s enthusiasm in the matter of the possibil-
ity of a naturalistic worldview towards opening 
the innermost deposits of human energy. On 
the contrary, according to Taylor, the atrophy 
of spiritual sources on the grounds of reduc-
tive naturalism inhibits human development, 
preventing it from articulating and under-
standing its moral horizon. According to the 
Canadian philosopher, the effective articula-
tion of moral sources releases their strength, 
and their repression causes their gradual dis-
appearance as a result of cutting off access 
to them. Every moral horizon requires the 
adoption of ontology. Naturalistic ontology to 
which utilitarianism refers, implies ontological 
monism, consisting in the reduction of all spir-
itual phenomena to the physical world. For 
these reasons, Jürgen Habermas acknowl-
edges that the image of the world offered by 
reductionist naturalism is not at all science 
but bad metaphysics[37]. A good ontology is 
36Wilson, E. O. On Human Nature, p. 201.
37Habermas, J. (2008) Between Naturalism and Religion. Polity 
Press, Cambridge
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such an ontology that offers the best possible 
interpretation for our self-understanding. Our 
understanding of ourselves is crucial for mo-
rality, because it influences what and how we 
experience, and how we behave. Evolutionary 
naturalism provides an explanation of natural 
cognitive abilities and moral powers which 
at the same time undermine their credibility. 
Starting from the assumptions of evolution-
ary naturalism, we cannot claim that we have 
privileged cognitive access to the world, but 
only the access that best serves our survival. 
We cannot assume that objective truth, let 
alone an objective good, is more conducive 
to survival than illusion or superstition. From 
the point of view of evolutionary naturalism, 
therefore, we should not take seriously the 
content of any beliefs, including those regard-
ing the scientific image of the world on which 
evolutionary naturalism is based which was 
noticed not only by Nietzsche, but also by 
many contemporary philosophers[38]. Self-un-
derstanding on the ground of naturalism thus 
becomes a delusion[39]. 
Utilitarianism, supported by reductionist 
naturalism, has been formulated in opposi-
tion to traditional ethical doctrines having 
38In particular, it is worth paying attention to the extremely clear 
and convincing arguments of Nagel and Plantinga: Nagel, T. 
(2012) Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian 
Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford; Plantinga, A. (2011) Where the Conflict 
Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford.
39Spaemann, R. Osoby…, p. 65. 
their sources in metaphysics. Its representa-
tives need both a reductionist ontology which 
serves to reject religion and metaphysics, 
as well as a strong moral foundation which they 
accept in isolation from its sources. The prob-
lem is that these two elements are difficult to 
reconcile with each other, as Taylor points out, 
they are even mutually exclusive[40]. A philoso-
phy which needs opponents to express its own 
moral sources, as Taylor points out, is parasitic 
and cannot survive as an independent way of 
thinking[41]. The strength of this doctrine lies in 
the fact that it appeals to valuations (values of 
rationality, pursuit of happiness and universal 
benevolence) deeply rooted in contemporary 
culture and our self-interpretation, although it 
officially rejects their sources. Speaking from 
a moral position which it cannot acknowledge 
and based on moral insights which it does 
not give a justified place to, it reveals its great 
weakness and self-destructive tendencies. 
Naturalism therefore seems to be a powerful 
metanarrative which can be perfectly com-
bined with utilitarianism only when it affects us 
through its hidden moral horizon. Yet, as soon 
as we realize this, we are forced to give up 
naturalism, at least in its reductionist version[42]. 
40Taylor, Ch. Sources of the Self…, p. 336. 
41Ibidem, p. 339–340. 
42On the limitations of naturalism, not only in the field of 
morality, see Naturalism in: Question, eds. de Caro, M., 
Macarthur, D., (2004) Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
MA, London.
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